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German Council on Foreign Relations
To the Viktor  
Go the Spoils
What Orbán Needs to Form a 
New Political Camp in Europe 
The next months will show whether 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
can retain his influence in Europe even 
outside its largest political family. Hav-
ing left the center-right European Peo-
ple’s Party before his party was finally 
pushed out, Orbán is now trying to re-
group and unite the populist and Eu-
roskeptic forces in European Parliament. 
What looks like a defeat could still be 
turned to his advantage if it leads to a 
lasting reshuffle of political alliances 
and strengthens illiberal voices.
After years of tension between the 
Hungarian Fidesz party and the Euro-
pean Peoples’ Party (EPP), Viktor Orbán 
needed only two weeks to take his par-
ty out of its European political family. 
On March 3, after the EPP group adapt-
ed its rules of procedure to allow it to 
expel a party delegation, the Hungari-
an Prime Minister announced that he 
was withdrawing his 11 members of Eu-
ropean Parliament (MEPs) from its larg-
est political grouping. This decision has 
not changed the balance of power in 
European Parliament. The EPP remains 
its strongest group with 175 MEPs out 
of the 705 seats, well ahead of the Pro-
gressive Alliance of Socialists and Dem-
ocrats with 145 MEPs. 
 
Orbán formalized the divorce on March 
18 when he handed in his party’s official 
resignation. Many in the EPP will have 
breathed a sigh of relief. The EPP has 
long been accused of turning a blind 
eye to the way Hungary’s ruling party is 
dismantling democracy and rolling back 
the rule of law, media freedom, and civ-
il liberties. Even though Fidesz was sus-
pended two years ago, Orbán had con-
tinued to brazenly cross red lines.
RISKS FROM EUROPE
For now, Orbán’s party has lost its in-
fluential positions in the European Par-
liament: one vice-presidency and three 
vice-chairmanships of parliamenta-
ry committees. But it is mainly the po-
litical protection and respectabili-
ty that stemmed from membership in 
the EPP that Orbán will miss. Without 
it, it seems that Hungary can no lon-
ger count on the restraint of German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel; she con-
sistently prioritized EU cohesion over 
antagonizing this tricky little mem-
ber state. In the vote on the EPP’s rules 
of procedure, all German MEPs from 
Merkel’s sister parties, the Christian 
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Union (CDU/CSU), stood firm. More-
over, Orbán cited a phone call with 
Armin Laschet, the CDU’s new chair-
man, as reaffirmation of his decision to 
leave the EPP. Markus Söder, the head 
of the CSU, also actively expressed 
support for the expulsion of Fidesz.
Therefore, on the face of it, Orbán’s de-
cision to remove Fidesz from the EPP 
is a risky move. He is facing two polit-
ical showdowns with Brussels ahead of 
Hungarian parliamentary elections in 
spring 2022: one on the ongoing Article 
7 procedure and the other on the im-
plementation of the rule of law regula-
tion. And yet, Hungary is not likely to 
feel much pressure on either dossier – 
at least in the immediate term.
The Article 7 procedure, which, in the-
ory, provides for sanctions on mem-
ber states if there is a clear risk of a se-
rious breach of European values, has 
been moving very slowly. The final de-
cision on Article 7 needs to be made 
unanimously by the national govern-
ments in the European Council, but 
Hungary and Poland, the other coun-
try under this procedure, have been 
actively supporting each other there. 
It is a similar picture for the new rule 
of law conditionality mechanism, 
which is linked to the multiannual EU 
budget. This mechanism was approved 
in December 2020 after lengthy nego-
tiations. Before applying it, however, 
the European Commission will have to 
wait until the EU’s Court of Justice de-
cides whether the regulation on which 
it is based is even legal. Moreover, even 
if the rule of law mechanism is applied 
starting next year, it will focus only on 
new and not past cases. The bottom 
line is that it will not damage Fidesz’s 
economic support base in Hungary let 
alone prevent the party’s supporters 
from receiving substantial EU funds in 
the run-up to Hungary’s 2022 parlia-
mentary elections. 
ORBÁN’S RATIONALE
Consequently, what currently looks 
like a defeat could still be turned to 
Orbán’s advantage. True, Orbán has al-
ways been careful to stay close to the 
center of power in Europe, allowing 
him to play a spoiler role without be-
coming isolated. But this very fear of 
isolation is now driving him to create 
an ambitious alternative political plat-
form on the EU level in order to am-
plify his voice and regain his leverage 
outside the EPP. If his past modus ope-
randi is any indication, the Hungari-
an Prime Minister will proceed as the 
cunning political veteran he is. He will 
likely ponder all tactical options and 
rely on the following factors: 
First, Orbán is viscerally aware of the 
“numbers game” – above all, the rel-
ative weight of each member state 
across the EU’s institutions. For this 
reason, his next moves will be closely 
coordinated with other far-right par-
ties in western Europe, particular-
ly with Matteo Salvini’s Lega. The Lega 
party has established itself as a leading 
force in Italian politics and has one of 
the largest national delegations in the 
European Parliament. 
Second, he sees an advantage in being 
able to reach out to different, com-
peting factions on the right and far-
right in Europe. While some of these 
parties and their leaders are not on 
speaking terms with each other, they 
all talk to Orbán. 
Third, he will continue to exploit the 
mechanics of the EU system – not so 
much in pursuit of a specific policy 
agenda but to achieve protection for 
himself. Orbán has always been ea-
ger to shape “blocking minorities” with 
a combined influence in the Europe-
an Council and European Parliament to 
shield his own government from puni-
tive actions by EU institutions.  
Fourth, he will dress this political ma-
neuvering up as a “cultural battle” for 
the future of Europe. Orbán will cre-
ate a narrative based on identity issues, 
claiming to form a new camp for those 
– to quote from his letter to Manfred 
Weber, head of the EPP group – “who 
do not want migrants, who do not want 
multiculturalism, who have not de-
scended into LGBTQ lunacy, who de-
fend Europe’s Christian traditions, [and] 
who respect the sovereignty of nations.” 
ORBÁN’S OPTIONS
Orbán will now be running through 
his available options for Fidesz. At first 
glance, looking only at group size, join-
ing the far-right Identity and Democ-
racy (ID) group seems the most attrac-
tive. With 75 MEPs, it is currently the 
fourth-largest bloc in European Par-
liament. Dominated by the Italian Lega 
with 27 MEPs and the French Rassem-
blement National (RN) with 23 MEPs, 
the group also includes representa-
tives from the Alternative for Germany 
Orbán’s fear of isolation is  
now driving him to create an  
ambitious alternative political  
platform on the EU level
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(AfD) and a number of smaller far-
right parties, mainly from western and 
northern Europe. Yet, such a scenario 
seems unlikely. Not only would Orbán’s 
influence in this grouping be very lim-
ited, but joining it would also risk com-
plicating his already fraught rela-
tionship with Germany’s mainstream 
conservative parties, the CDU/CSU, 
since it contains the far-right AfD.
Thus, joining the conservative, Eu-
roskeptic group of the European Con-
servatives and Reformists (ECR) would 
appear to be the easier option for Fi-
desz. According to recent data from 
Votewatch on votes in European Par-
liament, Fidesz tends to agree with the 
ECR group a remarkable 72 percent 
of the time (compared to 51 percent 
with the ID). Still, joining this party on-
ly seems feasible as an interim solu-
tion. The ECR group is dominated by 
Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party 
(PiS), which, after the exit of the Brit-
ish conservatives, makes up almost half 
of the whole group with 27 of its 62 
MEPs. Orbán’s party would, therefore, 
be relegated to second fiddle by a par-
ty it has come to look upon as a junior 
partner. Although Orbán enjoys close 
relations with PiS, he is used to deter-
mining the political climate in Warsaw.
Nevertheless, if Orbán can persuade 
other large parties to join ECR along 
with Fidesz, he can dilute PiS’s influ-
ence and balance factions. According-
ly, Orbán is now trying to persuade the 
Italian Lega, the Slovenian Democratic 
Party of Prime Minister Janez Janša, and 
several other parties to join ECR. There 
will, of course, be opposition from the 
“Brothers of Italy,” the Italian party that 
is already a member of ECR, since it 
competes with Lega for the same na-
tional electorate. Moreover, it is unclear 
to what extent Poland’s ruling party is 
open to this scenario. Still, with such an 
expansion of its ranks, ECR could jump 
to 106 MEPs, making it the third-larg-
est group in European Parliament. ECR 
would then include three heads of gov-
ernments represented in the European 
Council (while the EPP’s representation 
there would drop from 11 to 9).
Forming a new group would give 
Orbán the advantage of choosing his 
allies. But it would also require him to 
gather at least 25 MEPs from at least 
7 member states – effectively necessi-
tating a complete reshuffle of the ex-
isting populist and Euroskeptic camps 
in European Parliament. If Orbán de-
cides to go this route, the key to his 
success will again be winning over Le-
ga. But Lega’s participation in Mario 
Draghi’s strongly pro-EU government 
in Rome illustrates a fundamental in-
ternal conflict over the party’s direc-
tion that is unlikely to be settled before 
Italian presidential elections in Feb-
ruary 2022. Still, a new group drawing 
MEPs from ECR, ID, and even from EPP 
itself (such as Janša’s 2 MEPs) would 
certainly have the potential to become 
the third- or fourth-largest group in 
European Parliament, rivalling the lib-
eral Renew Europe with its 97 MEPs. 
And the larger the faction, the more 
speaking time, money, and staff.  
ORBÁN’S FATE 
DEPENDS ON OTHERS
Officially, Orbán will only have to make 
up his mind before January 2022, when 
all of the key positions in European 
Parliament – from the president to the 
committee chairs – will be reallocated. 
But much is already at stake for Fidesz 
at home. After a decade in power, its 
support is slowly declining. For the first 
time, the united opposition is ahead 
of Fidesz in some polls. The prospect 
of a nasty, combative campaign ahead 
of Hungarian parliamentary elections 
in spring 2022 is a good motivator for 
quickly finding a new political home 
for Fidesz. As his government is like-
ly to manipulate electoral legislation, 
campaign rules, and the media, Orbán 
will need a new European platform 
from which to fend off mounting crit-
icism from EU institutions and to pres-
ent himself to the Hungarian electorate 
as both a victim of “liberal Europe” and 
savior of “Christian Europe.” 
Orbán’s maneuvers matter. While 
Fidesz only contributes a small num-
ber of MEPs, its leader is a magnet for 
other populist forces in Europe. During 
the pandemic, many of those far-right 
parties cast aside their more hardline 
anti-EU positions – including, like It-
aly’s Matteo Salvini or France’s Marine 
Le Pen, their arguments for leaving the 
euro. Thus, these parties became more 
acceptable allies, representing a camp 
that will be an even more formidable 
voice in the upcoming debate on the 
future of Europe. 
Nonetheless, the shape and political 
strength of this populist and far-right 
camp will eventually depend more 
on domestic developments in Italy or 
France than on those in Hungary. As 
Viktor Orbán knows perfectly well, size 
matters – also beyond the European 
Parliament. So the ultimate question is: 
which of the bigger players will decide 
to follow him?
Because Orbán is a magnet for  
other populist forces in Europe,  
his maneuvers matter
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